Disease Security In Northeast Asia : Biological Weapons and Natural Plagues
| Collection Location | perpustakaan akmil |
| Edition | |
| Call Number | 355.4 CHI d |
| ISBN/ISSN | 0-7315-5453-1 |
| Author(s) | Christian Enemark |
| Subject(s) | Strategi Militer |
| Classification | 355.4 |
| Series Title | GMD | BUKU |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | Australian National University |
| Publishing Year | 2004 |
| Publishing Place | Australia |
| Collation | 21cm;xi;138hal |
| Abstract/Notes | In Northeast Asia and around the world, new infectious diseases are emerging and old ones are re-emerging in deadlier guises. The increasing human cost of such diseases creates an imperative for scholars and policy makers to think beyond biological weapons (BW) when contemplating disease and security. Whether deliberately or naturally caused, infectious diseases threaten the national security of states, the personal security of individuals, and are potentially a transnational security threat to all individuals in all societies. At the conceptual level, and for the purpose of responding to these threats, it is useful to think in terms of 'disease security'. An infectious disease, whether of state, terrorist or natural origin, becomes a security threat when its effects reach the point of imposing an intolerable burden on a society. That burden can be measured in terms of the number of people infected and killed, and by the level of disruption and instability that accompanies the disease. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the utility of examining disease in two dimensions, natural and deliberate, and of adopting dual use responses accordingly. Northeast Asia was chosen as a case study because it is a centre of gravity for concerns about disease security. This is due to the region's military history, its high proportion of suspected BW states, fears of biological terrorism, and the region's special vulnerability to new and re-emerging infectious diseases. A number of measures have been and could be applied in Northeast Asia to enhance disease security. Against the threat of BW, military and intelligence responses include tactical response units, deterrence of BW use by threat of nuclear attack, the use of force to destroy BW assets, and the recently-devised Proliferation Security Initiative. There is also scope to address disease-based threats through the legal framework of the Biological Weapons Convention. The most promising approach to disease security is through enhanced public health capabilities. This is essentially a dual use response applicable to both BW and naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease. Its two main pillars are disease surveillance networks (domestic and international) and robust public health systems. |
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